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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, Texas has experienced more wind generator
investment than any other U.S. state.  It now has the most installed
wind capacity of any state,1 and wind power accounts for a larger
share of total generation in Texas than in most other states.2
Favorable wind resources and the relative ease of siting large projects
have contributed to Texas’s prominence in wind investment and gen-
eration.3  Numerous policies have also played important roles, such as
the federal tax credit for wind generation, the state’s renewable port-
folio standard (“RPS”), and a regulatory environment conducive to
new investment in the electric power sector.4
With nearly fifteen years of hindsight, the Authors derive lessons
from the major federal and state policies that have helped wind gener-
ation in Texas.  The Authors conduct this retrospective analysis at a
time when many other states have ambitious renewable energy re-
source requirements; for example, California requires that renewables
† Joshua Linn is a fellow at Resources for the Future and can be reached by
email at linn@rff.org or by telephone at 202-328-5047. Clayton Munnings is a research
assistant at Resources for the Future. This research has been supported by the Heis-
ing-Simons Foundation.
1. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#gencapaci
ty (follow “XLS” hyperlink in the row titled “Existing capacity by energy source, by
producer, by state back to 2000 (annual data from the EI-860)”) (last visited Feb. 1,
2014) [hereinafter USEIA 2000].
2. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#genera
tion (follow “XLS” hyperlink in the row titled “Net generation by state by type of
producer by energy source, monthly back to 2005 (EIA-906, EIA-920, and EIA-
923)”) (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter USEIA 2005].
3. Jay Zarnikau, Successful Renewable Energy Development in a Competitive
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account for 33% of generation by 2020.5  At the same time, extensive
debate over federal policy continues, including whether to continue or
renew subsidies to renewables.  The lessons from the Texas experience
can help guide these future policy decisions.
To provide background, the next Section summarizes aggregate
trends in investment and generation in Texas and considers these
trends in the national context.  The Authors also briefly describe the
federal production tax credit (“PTC”), which has been claimed for
many recent wind power projects, and the Texas RPS.  Texas also has
a “green power” market that creates market-based incentives for in-
vestment in renewables; however, the Authors are not aware of any
detailed analysis of this program, so the Authors focus on the RPS.
The Authors discussion includes the policies that encourage renew-
ables investment directly and reduce pollution emissions, leaving aside
other policy developments such as the deregulation of the electricity
sector that occurred during the same time period.
The following Section looks at the economics of wind power, and
distinguishes the market and environmental values of new wind gener-
ators.  Market value arises from displaced generation and investment
resulting from the new wind generator, and the environmental value
from the avoided pollution emissions from fossil-fuel-fired generators.
Because the Authors focus on policies that aim to reduce pollution
emissions, the Authors do not include other environmental issues such
as the effects of the policies on bird populations.
In the main Section, the Authors draw three policy lessons from the
discussion of market and environmental values.  While several other
articles have analyzed wind policy in Texas, the Authors’ focus is dis-
tinct in its attempt to draw important lessons for state and federal
efforts to promote renewables.  Briefly, the three lessons are as
follows:
1. In Texas, the environmental benefits of wind power arise prima-
rily from displaced natural gas generation and to a lesser extent
from displaced coal generation.
2. Although existing Texas policies have promoted substantial
wind investment, other policies would likely reduce pollution
emissions at lower costs.
3. Coordinating policies for renewables and grid infrastructure can
greatly lower the cost of reducing emissions.
The final Section offers a few concluding remarks for state and federal
policy.
5. DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY
(“DSIRE”), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CA
25R (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
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II. WIND INVESTMENT AND POLICIES IN TEXAS, 2000–2012
In this Section, the Authors provide a brief summary of Texas wind
investment since the year 2000, as well as an overview of the key fed-
eral and state policies promoting wind investment in Texas.  The pur-
pose of this Section is not to explain the wind investment, but merely
to provide some background.
A. Wind Investment and Generation in Texas
Figure 1 shows wind capacity in Texas and all other states within the
United States, measured in gigawatts (“GW”) of capacity.6  Wind ca-
pacity in other states increased from about 2 to 36 GW over the years
2000 to 2011; by comparison, the entire U.S.  power system has ap-
proximately 1,100 GW of capacity.7  Over the same period, wind ca-
pacity in Texas increased from close to 0 to about 10 GW.8  Thus,
Texas accounted for about 23% of total wind capacity in 2011, al-
though the state accounts for only about 10% of total U.S. capacity.9
Texas far exceeds the national average in the contribution of wind
generation to total generation.10  In 2010, the share in Texas was about
three times higher than the national average.11  Figure 2 shows the
share of generation accounted for by wind power for Texas, the
United States, and Iowa, the state with the highest generation share.12
Iowa, like other states in the upper Midwest and Plains, derives a
large share of its generation from wind power.13  But because fewer
people live in the upper Midwest and Plains than in Texas, total wind
capacity is higher in Texas.
Having some of the country’s best wind resources partly explains
why Texas has so much more wind capacity than any other state.  Fig-
ure 3 shows a map of the United States that has been color coded to
represent estimated onshore wind resources.  Darker colors reflect
more favorable wind locations, and a large section in western Texas is
colored orange and pink, indicating fair to good wind resources.14








14. Renewable Portfolio Standards, DEP’T OF ENERGY AND MINERAL ENG’G,
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/ebf200up/node/198 (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (refer-
encing the graph, which shows the quantity of electricity generated by each type of
fuel since 1996).
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B. Federal PTC and Texas RPS
Federal and state policies have also contributed to wind investment
in Texas.  The U.S. Congress created the PTC for renewable energy in
the 1992 Energy Policy Act.15  The PTC provides a corporate tax
credit (equivalent to a subsidy) for each megawatt hour (“MWh”) of
electricity a renewable generator produces for the first ten years that
the generator operates.16  The credit currently equals $23 per MWh
for wind generators and rises with inflation.17  Wind power projects
have claimed roughly two-thirds of the total subsidy value issued
under the PTC to date.18  The PTC nearly expired in 2013 before Con-
gress extended it one additional year through the American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012,19 but it has since expired (the PTC will continue to
be earned by wind generators that began construction prior to
expiration).
Although no rigorous analysis has assessed the effects of the PTC
on wind investment in Texas or elsewhere, recent experience suggests
that the PTC has had an important effect.  For example, the PTC
lapsed three times—in 2000, 2002, and 2004—only to be renewed
again each subsequent year.20  Wind developers did not install any
projects in Texas each year after the PTC lapsed, providing some evi-
dence for the importance of the tax credit.21  The PTC also contrib-
utes to negative wholesale electricity prices, which have been common
in western Texas.  Prices can turn negative when available transmis-
sion capacity cannot deliver all of the electricity generated by wind in
western Texas to eastern Texas, where most of the electricity demand
is located.  During these times, owners of wind generators are willing
to supply electricity at negative prices because they can still earn prof-
its from the PTC.  Prices would be less likely to turn negative in the
absence of the PTC because wind generator owners would not offer to
sell electricity below their marginal costs, which roughly equal zero.22
The Texas RPS has likely played an important role in wind invest-
ment, at least in the early 2000s.  In 1999, the Texas legislature passed
15. Kevin M.  Walsh, Renewable Energy Financial Incentives: Focusing on Federal
Tax Credits and the Section 1603 Cash Grant: Barriers to Development, 36 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 207, 212 (2013).
16. DSIRE, http://dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F
(last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
17. Id.
18. Harrison Fell, Joshua Linn & Clayton Munnings, Designing Renewable Elec-
tricity Policies to Reduce Emissions, Discussion Paper (Resources for the Future,
Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2012, at 9, http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-12-54
.pdf.
19. American Tax Payer Relief Act of 2012, H.R. 8, 112th Cong. § 407 (2012).
20. See Fell et al., supra note 18, at 9.
21. Walsh, supra note 15, at 233.
22. C. K. Woo et al., Wind Generation and Zonal-Market Price Divergence: Evi-
dence from Texas, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3928, 3931 (2011), available at http://www
.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510008700.
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the RPS, which initially required 2 GW of new capacity to be installed
by 2009.23  The state exceeded this level far ahead of time,24 and in
2005 the legislature increased the RPS to 10 GW by 2025.25  The state
also exceeded this increased level ahead of time, by 2010.
The RPS includes a system of renewable energy credits (“RECs”).
A qualifying renewable generator creates a REC for each MWh of
electricity it generates.  Each load-serving entity, which includes re-
tailers and certain cooperatives and municipal utilities,26 must gener-
ate its own renewable electricity or purchase enough RECs to meet its
RPS requirement, where the requirement depends on the firm’s
sales.27
A number of articles have assessed the success of the Texas RPS,28
although the literature has not settled on a definition of success.  The
Authors consider the narrower and more fundamental question of
whether the RPS has affected wind investment in Texas.  During the
early 2000s, installed wind capacity was only slightly above the levels
required by the RPS, and REC prices were between $10 and $16 per
MWh.29  By the late 2000s, however, installed wind capacity exceeded
the levels required by the RPS.  In 2007, for example, wind developers
had installed more than twice the amount of capacity required by the
RPS,30 and REC prices fell to around $2 per MWh;31 see Figure 4.
Although the RPS may have stimulated wind development in the
early 2000s, clearly other factors were important by the late 2000s,
such as the PTC.32  We discuss this possibility further in Section IV.
Transmission policies have also been important in wind develop-
ment.  The western part of the state contains the best wind resources
in Texas, as shown in Figure 3,33 whereas most of the demand comes
from the eastern part of the state.34  Transmission lines must deliver
the wind power produced in western Texas to the eastern part of the
state, and Woo et al. show that between 2007 and 2010, transmission
23. Tex. S.B. 7, 76th Leg., R.S., § 39.904 (1999).
24. Woo et al., supra note 22, at 3930.
25. Tex. S.B. 20, 79th Leg., 1st C.S., § 3 (2005).
26. ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/services/rq/lse/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
27. See Zarnikau, supra note 3, at 3908.
28. Ole Langniss & Ryan Wiser, The Renewables Portfolio Standard in Texas: An
Early Assessment, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 527 (2003); Zarnikau, supra note 3; M.C.
Faconti, How Texas Overcame California as a Renewable State: A Look at the Texan
Renewable Energy Success, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 411 (2012); Richard Schmalensee,
Evaluating Policies to Increase Electricity Generation from Renewable Energy, 6 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 45, 46–48 (2011).
29. Schmalensee, supra note 28, at 58.
30. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/index
.html (follow “2007 ZIP” hyperlink, file “Geny07”) (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
31. See Schmalensee, supra note 28, at 58.
32. Langniss & Wiser, supra note 28, at 530.
33. See PENN STATE COLLEGE OF EARTH AND MINERAL SCIENCES, https://www.e-
education.psu.edu/ebf200up/node/198 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
34. Woo et al., supra note 22, at 3930.
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capacity was often insufficient to deliver all of the available wind-gen-
erated electricity.35  Such transmission congestion caused electricity
prices to be lower in the western part of the state and higher in the
eastern part than if there had been no congestion.36  The transmission
congestion may have reduced investment in new wind generators be-
cause the congestion reduced the revenues of new wind generators in
western Texas.
To address the inefficiencies associated with transmission conges-
tion, Texas has spent approximately $5 billion in increasing transmis-
sion capacity.37  In 2005, Texas created competitive renewable energy
zones (“CREZs”), which enabled the expansion of transmission ca-
pacity between regions with favorable wind resources and the rest of
the state.38  The transmission capacity expansions, which are nearing
completion, will reduce the likelihood that prices in regions with high
wind resources will fall below prices in other regions.  This lower like-
lihood of regional price divergence should increase incentives for new
wind investment, and the expanded transmission capacity is expected
to support an additional 8 GW of wind capacity.39  The additional ca-
pacity should also reduce the total cost of generating electricity, but
whether the benefits of the transmission capacity investment turn out
to exceed the costs is an open question.
III. ECONOMICS OF WIND GENERATION
The Texas electricity market provides consumers with electricity,
but also creates pollution emissions because of fossil-fuel combustion
at coal- and gas-fired generators.  As discussed above, considerable
wind investment has occurred in Texas, and wind’s share in total gen-
eration is much higher in Texas than in most other states.  This Section
discusses the value of wind generators to society.
A. The Inapplicability of LCOE to Wind Generators
The Authors use the term “market value” to describe the value of a
hypothetical wind generator to a potential investor.  Investors com-
monly use the levelized cost of energy (“LCOE”) as part of their eval-
uation of whether to proceed with a particular project.  The LCOE is,
essentially, the average cost of providing a unit of electricity over the
generator’s lifetime.  Investors can compare the LCOE with the aver-
age price of electricity that the generator would receive (for example,
by selling into a wholesale market or under long-term contract with a
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3931.
37. Zarnikau, supra note 3, at 3910.
38. Tex. S.B. 20, 79th Leg., 1st C.S., § 3 (2005).
39. Diana Liebmann, Market Headwinds Persist for U.S. Wind Capital, N. AM.
WINDPOWER, at 1 (2011), https://www.haynesboone.com/files/Uploads/Documents/
Third-Party%20Articles/NAW%20(Liebmann).pdf.
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utility).  For a potential investor deciding whether to invest in a partic-
ular wind project, if the project’s LCOE is lower than the electricity
price, the investor should go ahead with the project because expected
revenues exceed expected costs.  Thus, the LCOE can form the basis
of a simple decision rule about whether to invest in a particular
project.
Many analysts also use the LCOE to compare the expected profit-
ability of different generation technologies.  For example, the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology study on the future of nuclear power
compares the LCOE of hypothetical natural gas, coal, and nuclear
generators.40  This comparison is appropriate because all three tech-
nologies are “base load,” meaning that they operate most of the time.
Therefore, owners of these generators expect to receive the average
price of electricity over the generators’ lifetime—effectively, the tech-
nologies would all receive the same revenue per unit of electricity gen-
eration.41  Comparing the profitability of these technologies,
therefore, amounts to comparing their LCOE—the technology with
the lowest LCOE is most profitable.
But as Joskow42 and Fell and Linn43 argue, comparing the LCOE of
wind with those of other technologies does not provide information
about whether the wind generator is more profitable than other gen-
erators.  The fact that a wind generator produces electricity only when
the wind blows, termed “intermittency,” complicates the comparison
between wind and other technologies.  Because of intermittency, a
wind generator cannot operate as a base load generator.  A wind gen-
erator also cannot operate as a “peaking” generator, which operates
only during periods of high demand.  Instead, generation from a wind
generator varies over time in accordance with wind speed.
Because wind generators produce electricity only under favorable
wind conditions, the revenue of a particular wind generator depends
on the temporal correlation between wind availability and electricity
prices.44  The four curves in Figure 5 show total electricity demand by
hour on an average day in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
market, which covers most of Texas.  Each curve represents a different
season of the year.  Demand is lowest in the early morning and in-
creases over the day, peaking at around 5 p.m. in most seasons and
decreasing at the end of the day.  The figure also shows that the daily
40. Eric S. Beckjord et al., The Future of Nuclear Power, MASS. INST. OF TECH., at
42 (2003), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/nuclearpower-full_0.pdf.
41. Policies that affect the profitability of some of these technologies but not
others, such as loan guarantees, would be included in the LCOE calculation and
would not—in this comparison—affect revenue.
42. Paul L. Joskow, Comparing the Costs of Intermittent and Dispatchable Electric-
ity Generating Technologies, 3 AM. ECON. REV. 238, 239 (2011).
43. See Harrison Fell & Joshua Linn, Renewable Electricity Policy, Heterogeneity
and Cost Effectiveness, 66 J.  ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 688, 692 (2013).
44. Id. at 688.
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pattern differs across seasons.  Demand varies less over the day in
winter and fall than in summer, for example.
Figure 6 shows the implications of intermittency for the revenue of
a hypothetical wind generator in Texas.  The figure illustrates the esti-
mated wind generator capacity factors by season for western Texas.  It
has been constructed from simulated wind data and represents typical
patterns observed at wind generators in western Texas.  Comparing
Figures 5 and 6 shows that wind generation correlates negatively with
electricity demand.  In fact, the correlation is negative both over the
course of the day and across seasons.  Demand tends to peak in the
middle of the day and in the summer, when wind generation is lowest.
What does the negative correlation imply for the value of wind gen-
eration?  Recall that the typical comparison of technologies, based on
LCOE, relies on the premise that the technologies being considered
receive the same average price over their lifetimes.  For a base load
generator, this would roughly equal average price across all hours.
But in Texas and other regions with active wholesale electricity mar-
kets, the price is proportional to demand: prices rise and fall with de-
mand.  Because prices correlate positively with demand and wind
generation correlates negatively with demand, wind generation nega-
tively correlates with prices.45  Because of the negative correlation, a
typical wind generator in western Texas receives less than the average
price.  Therefore, although a hypothetical wind generator can have a
lower LCOE than a hypothetical natural gas generator, the natural
gas generator may still be more profitable than the wind generator
because it earns more revenue.  The Authors conclude that comparing
wind and other technologies on the basis of LCOE is not appropriate;
no investor would make a decision to build a new wind generator
based only on the LCOE.  Instead, the investor compares the costs of
the wind generator with the value of the wind generator.
B. Market Value of a Wind Generator
The market value of a wind generator derives from two sources.46
The first is the generation displaced by the wind generator.  Figure 7
provides a useful approximation of the Texas electricity market in a
particular hour.  The vertical curve represents the demand curve.
Electricity demand is vertical (or nearly so, in reality) because most
consumers cannot adjust electricity consumption immediately in re-
sponse to the price of electricity.  This may change with increasing
penetration of certain technologies, such as air conditioners that shut
off when electricity prices rise, but presently electricity demand is ap-
proximately vertical over short time periods, such as within a month.
45. Id. at 689.
46. Id. at 692.
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(The Authors do not argue that consumers do not respond to electric-
ity prices, only that they do not respond immediately.)
The upward-sloping curve represents the supply curve.  The curve
plots the marginal cost of producing electricity against total supply.
Wind, hydroelectric, and nuclear generators in Texas have the lowest
marginal costs.  Coal generators have historically been next in cost,
with natural gas generators having the highest marginal costs, al-
though recently the marginal costs of some natural gas generators
have fallen below those of some coal generators because of low natu-
ral gas prices.47  Nonetheless, for the purposes of our discussion, the
Authors will treat coal generators as having lower marginal costs than
natural gas generators, as this was the case throughout most of the
2000s.
The intersection of the demand and supply curves determines the
electricity price.  The price equals the marginal costs of the highest-
cost generator in operation.  If demand were lower, the price would
also be lower; at very low levels of demand, a coal generator may
operate at the margin, which means that it is the highest-cost genera-
tor in operation.  Note that this diagram makes a number of simplifi-
cations; for example, in practice, the marginal costs of the generators
may depend on whether they operated in the previous hour.  None-
theless, this diagram provides enough detail to illustrate the basic eco-
nomics of wind generation.
Suppose that Figure 7 represents the Texas market for one hour in
2007.  A particular natural gas generator sets the price in that hour.
Suppose, further, that in 2008 a new wind generator is constructed.  In
our simple example, everything else stays the same between 2007 and
2008.  The wind generator has zero marginal costs, so it effectively
causes the supply curve to shift incrementally to the right.  This causes
the marginal gas generator from 2007 to decrease its generation by the
same amount as the wind generation increases.  Effectively, the wind
generation displaces natural gas generation.
The market-wide cost of producing electricity consequently de-
creases in proportion to the marginal costs of the displaced natural gas
generation.  This avoided cost represents the first source of market
value of the wind generation.  When electricity demand is low, the
avoided costs—and hence the market value—also tends to be low.
Therefore, a wind generator whose generation is negatively correlated
with demand has lower market value than one whose generation is
positively correlated with demand.  Fell and Linn48 use a computa-
tional model to compare the market values from displaced generation
47. Joseph A. Cullen & Erin T. Mansur, Will Carbon Prices Reduce Emissions in
the U.S. Electricity Industry? Evidence from the Shale Gas Experience 2 (Dartmouth
Univ., Working Paper, 2013), http://www.josephcullen.com/resources/CarbonShale.
pdf.
48. Fell & Linn, supra note 43, at 702.
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for different types of wind generators.  The market value is slightly
higher for hypothetical generators located on the Gulf Coast than for
generators in western Texas because the western generators produce
electricity that is more negatively correlated with demand.49
The wind generator has market value from the displaced genera-
tion, and the displaced investment is a second source of market
value.50  Firms choose to invest in new generators when the expected
revenues exceed costs.  An increase in wind generation causes the
supply curve to shift right, thereby reducing expected revenues and
the amount of investment in other generators.  The actual value of the
displaced investment depends on demand; wind availability; and other
factors; and quantifying this value requires a detailed model of the
electricity sector.  Fell and Linn compare the value of avoided invest-
ment for hypothetical wind and solar generators, concluding that the
value is substantial compared with the value of the avoided
generation.51
C. Environmental Value of a Wind Generator
Wind generators may have value to society beyond their market
values.  Social values arising from the health and environmental bene-
fits of reduced pollution emissions from fossil-fuel-fired generators
would justify, on economic grounds, policies that create incentives for
wind investment.
Similar to the common misperception about using the LCOE to
compare wind and other electricity generation technologies, a com-
mon misperception exists about the environmental value of wind gen-
erators.52  An often-repeated view of renewable electricity generators
is that because they have zero emissions, they have the same environ-
mental value as one another.  But just as the market value derives
from the displaced generation, environmental value derives from dis-
placed emissions from fossil-fuel combustion at coal- and gas-fired
generators.
In Texas, as in other parts of the United States, fossil-fuel genera-
tors operate at the margin most hours, but sometimes the marginal
generator is coal-fired and other times it is gas-fired.53  Whether the
marginal generator uses coal or gas depends on a variety of factors,
such as electricity demand and the composition of the generation
fleet.  In Texas, natural-gas-fired generators are usually at the margin,
although sometimes, particularly when demand is low, coal operates
49. See id.
50. Id. at 693.
51. Id. at 704.
52. Fell et al., supra note 18, at 7.
53. Anya Castillo & Joshua Linn, Incentives of Carbon Dioxide Regulation for In-
vestment in Low-Carbon Electricity Technologies in Texas, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1831,
1839–40 (2011).
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at the margin.54  As Figure 5 shows, demand tends to be low at night,
which is also when coal often operates at the margin.  Because coal
generators emit more particulates, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and
carbon dioxide than natural gas generators, much greater environ-
mental benefit results from displacing coal than gas.  Therefore, re-
newable generators that operate more at night and in the spring than
at other times have higher environmental value.
Figure 8 shows the results of a simulation analysis of the Texas sys-
tem using data from 2008.55  The figure plots the probability that a
coal generator operates at the margin by hour of the day.  The
probability peaks at night and in the early morning, when demand
tends to be low.  The figure also shows the capacity factor of hypothet-
ical wind and solar generators and indicates that a wind generator is
more likely than a solar generator to displace a coal generator.  The
environmental value therefore differs between wind and solar genera-
tors, and likewise the environmental value may differ between two
wind generators.  A wind generator with generation that is more nega-
tively correlated with demand than another wind generator may have
higher environmental value.  Thus, it is not true that the environmen-
tal value of all wind generators is the same.
IV. POLICY LESSONS FROM TEXAS
The Authors are not aware of a rigorous assessment of the costs and
benefits of the policies and regulations that have affected Texas wind
development.  However, despite this lack of analysis, the literature
supports three central lessons:
1. In Texas, the environmental benefits of wind power arise prima-
rily from displaced natural gas generation and to a lesser extent from
displaced coal generation. Several articles have examined whether
wind generators in Texas are more likely to displace coal-fired than
gas-fired generation.  Castillo and Linn use a computational model of
the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) market, which
covers most of Texas, and conclude that 1 MWh of wind generation
displaces about 0.75 MWh of natural gas generation and about 0.25
MWh of coal generation.56  The Authors base the analysis on simula-
tions of the ERCOT system, and the finding is consistent with those of
several  other studies that statistically estimate the effect of wind gen-
eration on fossil fuel–fired generation and emissions, including Cul-
len,57 Kaffine et al.,58 and Novan.59
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1839.
56. Id.
57. Joseph Cullen, Measuring the Environmental Benefits of Wind-Generated Elec-
tricity, 5 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POLICY 107 (Nov. 2013), http://www.josephcullen.com/
resources/measuringwind.pdf.
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As we noted in Section III.B not only do wind generators displace
generation from other generators, but they also displace investment in
other generators.  Fell and Linn simulated investment and generation
over a twenty-five-year time period in ERCOT.60  They concluded
that future wind investment would displace some natural gas invest-
ment but no coal investment.61  The finding is derived from the fact
that low natural gas prices made it unprofitable for firms to invest in
coal-fired generators, so without any wind investment, all of the in-
vestment would be in new natural gas generators.
2. Although renewables have expanded greatly in Texas, other poli-
cies would likely reduce pollution emissions at lower costs. Numerous
economists have argued that putting a price on carbon dioxide emis-
sions, as with a carbon tax or emissions cap, is less costly than other
policies, both in theory and in practice.62  An emissions price out-
performs other policies by providing broad incentives to reduce emis-
sions and by equating the magnitude of the incentives at the margin.
For example, a carbon price creates equal incentives to reduce emis-
sions by switching from coal- to gas-fired generation or by investing in
wind-powered generators.  On the other hand, other policies do not
create uniform incentives; for example, an RPS creates incentives for
investing in new renewables generators, but does not create incentives
for switching from coal to gas.  Therefore, to achieve a given amount
of emission reductions, the RPS relies on more renewables investment
than the carbon price.  Failing to take advantage of low-cost emission
reductions opportunities, like fuel switching, raises the overall cost of
the RPS compared with the emissions price; the same argument ap-
plies to the PTC.63
58. Daniel T.  Kaffine, Brannin J.  McBee & Jozef Lieskovsky, Emissions Savings
from Wind Power Generation in Texas, 34 ENERGY J. 155 (Jan. 2013).
59. Kevin Novan, Valuing the Wind: Renewable Energy Policies and Air Pollution
Avoided (Univ. of California–San Diego, Working Paper, 2011), http://undergraduate
studies.ss.uci.edu/files/economics/news_events/2012/Novan_JMP.pdf.
60. Fell & Linn, supra note 43, at 688–707.
61. Id. at 689.
62. Dallas Burtraw, Curtis Carlson, Maureen Cropper & Karen L.  Palmer, Sulfur
Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?, 108 J.  POLITI-
CAL ECON. 1292, 1318 (Dec. 2000); Hei Sing Chan, How Large are the Cost Savings
from Emissions Trading? An Evaluation of the U.S. Acid Rain Program 32 (Univ. of





HQ5wv482IIVg%3D%3D&attredirects=1; see also Lawrence H. Goulder, Ian W.H.
Parry & Dallas Burtray, Revenue-Raising versus Other Approaches to Environmental
Protection: The Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions, 28 RAND J.  ECON.
708 (1997) (arguing that an emissions price may not be cost-effective after accounting
for changes in product prices and labor supply).
63. Fell & Linn, supra note 43, at 690.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\1-3\TWR304.txt unknown Seq: 13  1-MAY-14 10:10
2014] LESSONS OF WIND POLICIES IN TEXAS 437
A further inefficiency of the PTC is that, by subsidizing investment,
the PTC puts downward pressure on electricity prices, which increases
electricity consumption in the long run.  Greater consumption trans-
lates to greater fossil-fuel-fired generation and emissions, and the
emissions increase offsets some of the initial emissions reductions
caused by the PTC.64
While the existing literature has generally relied on theory or analy-
sis of national or regional markets, Fell and Linn make a similar point
using data and simulations that pertain directly to the case of Texas.65
They show that an RPS and PTC cost much more than an emissions
price or a sector-wide emissions rate standard (sometimes referred to
as a clean energy standard).66  The greater cost derives partly from the
inability of the PTC or RPS to encourage fuel switching.  Another
shortcoming of the PTC and RPS is that both policies provide the
same incentives for a wind generator with high environmental value as
compared to a wind generator with a low environmental value.  An
emissions price, on the other hand, provides greater incentive for the
wind generator that has the higher environmental value.  Thus, the
PTC and RPS do not recognize differences in the environmental value
of wind generators, nor do they provide incentives for other types of
emissions reductions, besides renewables investment.67
However, other policies could be more costly than the RPS or PTC.
Fell and Linn also show that renewables policies that offer a flat sub-
sidy that does not depend on the market value of the renewables gen-
erators—such as an investment tax credit or some types of feed-in
tariffs—could have even higher costs than the RPS.68
3. Coordinating policies for renewables and grid infrastructure can
greatly improve the effectiveness of renewables policies in reducing
emissions at low costs. The entire ERCOT power system is located
within Texas, making it the only system located within a single state.
Transmission siting is much simpler than in other regions because
Texas can adopt transmission policies with relatively little involvement
from other states or the federal government.69  The resulting flexibil-
ity likely made it much easier for Texas to build transmission capacity
under the CREZ system.  Because of the relative ease of siting new
transmission lines in Texas, it was much easier to coordinate the
renewables and transmission policies than it would have been in other
states.  In particular, the CREZ transmission capacity investments
complemented the wind policies.
64. See Fell et al., supra note 18, at 20.
65. Fell & Linn, supra note 43, at 690.
66. Id.
67. See Fell et al., supra note 18, at 19–20.
68. Fell & Linn, supra note 43, at 705.
69. Faconti, supra note 28, at 421.
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Nonetheless, Texas did not perfectly coordinate its transmission pol-
icies with the renewables policies, at least in the 2000s.  Woo et al.
document the effects of wind capacity on transmission congestion, and
Figure 9 provides a simple picture of what happened.70  For much of
the 2000s, the ERCOT system included four zones: west, south, north,
and Houston.  The blue curve shows the probability that the price in
the western zone was more than 10% different from the average price
in the other three zones.  The probability rises noticeably at the same
time that the total installed wind capacity (the green curve) increased.
The positive correlation between the two curves provides some simple
graphical evidence of the effect of wind generation on congestion,
which is consistent with the more careful analysis of Woo et al.71
The congested transmission lines could not handle considerable
amounts of the available wind-generated electricity.  Because wind
generation has zero marginal costs and emits no pollution, the failure
to use all of the available wind generation raised the cost of generat-
ing electricity in the system and raised emissions because fossil-fuel-
fired generation replaced, to some extent, the unused wind-generated
electricity.  The Authors are not aware of research quantifying these
costs.
Although Texas responded quickly to the congestion by creating the
CREZ system, the experience in the late 2000s illustrates the costs
that can arise when policy makers do not perfectly harmonize the
transmission and renewables policies.  Other states likely face far
greater difficulties of harmonizing these policies because of the chal-
lenges of siting new transmission lines, such as in California.72
V. CONCLUSIONS
Texas has experienced the most investment in new wind generators
of any state in the United States since 2000.73  Favorable wind re-
sources and policies have contributed to the state’s prominence.74
The Authors have discussed three major lessons from the outcomes
of this wind investment.  First, the environmental benefits of wind
generation in Texas derive mostly from displaced natural gas genera-
tion.75  Wind generation could displace more coal generation in other
regions of the country that rely more heavily on coal to generate elec-
tricity, in which case the environmental benefits of wind generation
would be significantly greater.  Other regions that rely heavily on nat-
70. Woo et al., supra note 22, at 3930.
71. Id.
72. Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Au-
thority, 39 LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL. L. REV. 1016, 1022 (2009).
73. USEIA 2000, supra note 1.
74. Zarnikau, supra note 3, at 3910.
75. Fell & Linn, supra note 43, at 689.
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ural gas for electricity generation, such as California, would experi-
ence lower environmental benefits per unit of wind generation.
Second, Texas probably could have reduced pollution emissions at
lower costs using other policies, such as a clean electricity standard or
a price on carbon dioxide emissions.  The reason is that the federal
PTC and the state RPS reduce emissions only by promoting renew-
ables investment and do not incentivize other, possibly lower-cost, op-
portunities to reduce emissions, such as switching from coal- to gas-
fired generation.76  The previous Section also discussed the inefficien-
cies of reducing electricity prices by subsidizing investment.
And third, transmission congestion in the late 2000s and the ex-
panded capacity under the CREZ system demonstrate the importance
of coordinating renewables and transmission policies.  Because high-
quality resources for wind and other renewables are often located far
from the major sources of electricity demand, using policies to induce
large amounts of renewables investment without coordinating trans-
mission policies results in significantly higher system costs and emis-
sions than if transmission and renewables policies are coordinated.
Many other states have adopted a suite of policies to aggressively
promote renewables in the next several years.  Therefore, Texas offers
lessons that could help those states design their policies to reduce pol-
lution emissions at low cost to electricity producers and consumers.
Particularly relevant are (1) the need to coordinate renewables and
transmission policies; and (2) the fact that, in some regions of the
country, the environmental benefits will be relatively modest if renew-
ables primarily displace natural-gas-fired generation.  National policy
should promote investment in renewable electricity generators that
have the greatest combined market and environmental value.  Addi-
tionally, considerable debate has been ongoing at the federal level
over the continuation of the PTC and other subsidies to renewables,
and the experience in Texas suggests that other policies could be less
costly than the PTC and that they should be coordinated with trans-
mission (and distribution system) policies.
76. See Fell et al., supra note 18, at 19–20.
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VI. FIGURES
FIGURE 1. INSTALLED WIND CAPACITY (GW), 2000–201177
FIGURE 2. WIND GENERATION SHARE, 2001–201078
77. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, EXISTING CAPACITY BY
ENERGY SOURCE, BY PRODUCER, BY STATE BACK TO 2000, http://www.eia.gov/
electricity/data.cfm#gencapacity. The data series for Texas shows the total installed
wind generation capacity in gigawatts (“GW”) from 2000 to 2011. The data series for
all other states shows total GW of wind capacity for all U.S. states other than Texas.
78. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, NET GENERATION BY STATE
BY TYPE OF PRODUCER BY ENERGY SOURCE, MONTHLY BACK TO 2005, http://www
.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#gencapacity.
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FIGURE 3. U.S. WIND RESOURCES79
FIGURE 4. RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDIT PRICES IN TEXAS
(DOLLARS PER MWH), 2002–201080
79. PENN STATE COLLEGE OF EARTH AND MINERAL SCIENCES, RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS, https://www.e-education.psu.edu/ebf200up/node/198.
80. Richard Schmalensee, Evaluating Policies to Increase Electricity Generation
from Renewable Energy, 6 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 45, 45–64 (2012).
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FIGURE 5. HOURLY ERCOT LOAD BY SEASON81
81. ERCOT, HOURLY LOAD DATA ARCHIVES, http://www.ercot.com/gridinfo/
load/load_hist/. Each series in the figure plots the hourly load in the ERCOT System
for the indicated season, where hourly load is the average across days in 2008.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\1-3\TWR304.txt unknown Seq: 19  1-MAY-14 10:10
2014] LESSONS OF WIND POLICIES IN TEXAS 443
FIGURE 6. SIMULATED WIND GENERATOR CAPACITY FACTORS82
82. Anya Castillo & Joshua Linn, Incentives of Carbon Dioxide Regulation for
Investment in Low-Carbon Electricity Technologies in Texas, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1831,
1831–1844 (2011). The figure plots the average hourly capacity factor by season for
wind generators in Texas using data from simulated wind generation data from AWS
Truwind. The capacity factor is the ratio of simulated generation to maximum
generation for the corresponding wind generator, season, and hour. The average is
computed over all wind generators in the sample.
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FIGURE 7. SIMPLIFIED REPRESENTATION OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY











83. The figure plots the vertical demand curve and a simplified supply curve for a
particular hour in the ERCOT market. The supply curve is the marginal cost of
supplying electricity as a function of the amount of electricity supplied. Each
horizontal portion of the supply curve represents the indicated technology.  Marginal
costs and quantities are not drawn to scale.
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FIGURE 8. THE PROBABILITY OF WIND DISPLACING COAL84
84. Castillo & Linn, supra note 82. The green and red curves show the simulated
capacity factors for wind and solar photovoltaic generators, constructed similarly to
Figure 6. The blue curve plots the probability that a coal generator is operating at the
margin in the corresponding hour.
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FIGURE 9. THE PROBABILITY OF LARGE PRICE DIVERGENCE
BETWEEN WESTERN TEXAS AND THE
REMAINDER OF ERCOT85
85. The probability is computed using price data from ERCOT, www.ercot.com.
The installed wind capacity is constructed as in Figure 1, from U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION data, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#genca
pacity.
